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PREFACES AND POSTSCRIPTS:
WALZER’S JUST AND UNJUST WARS AT AGE 40
David Luban1

I must begin with a personal recollection. In 1977 I was
teaching philosophy at Kent State University, my first job out of
graduate school, and I visited Cambridge over winter break. In those
days before Amazon and the Internet, visiting an academic center
with a major bookstore was a pilgrimage of sacred status, and the
Harvard Coop was my temple of choice, up there with the legendary
bookstores of Hyde Park. At the Coop the first thing I saw on display
was stacks of the newly-published Just and Unjust Wars. I was
already a Walzer fan from reading Obligations, so I made a beeline
for the new book and, as the cliché goes, snapped it up and read it
straight through when I got home. The next fall I taught a seminar
on Just and Unjust Wars, and my students and I worked our way
through it chapter by chapter over a full ten-week quarter.
When I leafed through Just and Unjust Wars in the Harvard
Coop, I naturally fixed on the opening sentences of Walzer’s
preface:
I did not begin by thinking about war in general, but
about particular wars, above all about the American
intervention in Vietnam. Nor did I begin as a
philosopher, but as a political activist and a partisan.
On the next page, he explained his reason for writing the book: “I
promised myself that one day I would try to set out the moral
argument about war in a quiet and reflective way. … I want to
defend the business of arguing, as we did and as most people do, in
moral terms. Hence this book….”
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This stuff was like Chapman’s Homer to me – “then felt I
like some watcher of the skies when a new planet swims into his
ken.” The need was urgent to set aside the emotions and anger that
were tearing the country apart and reflect on Vietnam from a broader,
more dispassionate, more philosophical moral point of view. But
before Walzer, I think few of us had any idea how to start. Just and
Unjust Wars was my first exposure to just war theory, and to say it
was my best exposure would greatly understate how powerfully it
affected me. To borrow a Holmesian phrase, it hit me where I lived.
That, it turned out, was literally true, for the Vietnam War
was omnipresent in Kent, Ohio throughout the late ’70s when I
taught there. Even seven years after May 4, 1970, the shooting cast
a shadow over the campus, and that shadow was the shadow of the
war, inextricably linked with the antiwar movement and the
backlash against it. I knew some of the wounded students – one
paralyzed for life – as well as the parents of one student, Allison
Krause, who was killed. In that year of 1977 I memorably paced off
the shooting with one of the National Guardsmen involved, who
came back to town as an act of expiation. The Vietnam vets studying
at KSU on the GI Bill were my age, and some became my friends,
and co-activists.
I’ve been emphasizing Just and Unjust Wars’ Vietnam
connection, but an admirable fact about the book is that it is timeless
as well as timely. This places Walzer in the company of the just war
theorists of the past. When Grotius wrote The Rights of War and
Peace, he very much had in mind the war between Portugal and the
Dutch East Indies Company. But his famous defense of private war
is not simply a brief for the Dutch East Indies Company, although
the Company happened to be Grotius’s client. The arguments
transcend their epoch and they matter now. So too with Just and
Unjust Wars. To be sure, the book discusses the Vietnam War more
than once, and passes severe moral judgment on its justice and
conduct. Walzer has said that Israel’s Six Days’ War was also on his
mind when he wrote the book, and his chapter on prevention
vigorously defends Israel’s pre-emptive strike against the Egyptian
air force. But what’s noteworthy about these case-judgments is that
Walzer treats them no differently, no less even-handedly, and at no
greater length, than any of his other historical illustrations – no
differently than, say, the War of the Spanish Succession or Bradley’s
bombing of St. Lô.
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Just and Unjust Wars is now in its fifth edition, and each
succeeding edition includes an “updating” preface discussing issues
raised by the wars fought since the last edition. But these prefaces
are like the book itself – they raise issues of abiding, not just
temporary, importance, and Walzer treats them that way. Can any
modern war be just? – That’s the question in the preface to the 1992
edition, raised by objectors to the first Gulf War. What about
humanitarian interventions? – that’s his question in the 1999
edition’s preface, the year of Kosovo and four years after Srebrenica.
And what of the use of force-short-of-war, the jus ad vim –
a concept that Walzer introduced into just war theory in the preface
to the 2005 edition, when he considers what might have been done
instead of invading Iraq? In the fifth, and most recent edition, the
preface discusses the morality of asymmetrical conflicts, with the
U.S. vs. Taliban and Israel vs. Hamas conflicts in view. In the fifth
edition he also added a new postscript – his rejoinder to revisionist
just war theory. There, he reflects on the method of moral argument
when we think philosophically about war. Like the book itself, the
prefaces and postscript are at once timely and timeless. (I would
hope to see future editions reprint them all together.)
Within contemporary academic debates, philosophers often
call Walzer’s version of just war theory the “standard” or “orthodox”
view, and I couldn’t help noticing that in his new postscript Walzer
borrows those words as well. 2 Now in one way it’s undeniably
orthodox: his fundamentals coincide in most respects with the
international law of armed conflict. Walzer’s theory of just cause is
that of the U.N. Charter. The moral equality of soldiers is the law of
the Geneva Conventions; so is the moral equality of “their” civilians
and “ours.”3 The very architecture of the law of war separates jus ad
bellum and jus in bello by placing their rules in different legal
instruments.
But in the tradition of just war philosophy, there is nothing
standard or orthodox about Walzer at all – something I never
appreciated until, a few years ago, I finally doubled back to read the
historical authors Walzer cites4 – Aquinas and Augustine, Vitoria
and Grotius and Pufendorf. Call them “the Greats” for short. Among
2

JUJW, 5th ed., p. 345.
Additional Protocol I draws no nationality distinction when it imposes
obligations not to target civilians and to take all feasible steps to protect them.
4
JUJW, 5th ed., p. 336.
3

4

the Greats, aggression was by no means the unique crime of war,
nor was self-defense the sole just cause. Nor did the Greats
unanimously accept the moral equality of combatants: for example,
Vattel argued that as a moral matter it is wrong for soldiers to fight
on the unjust side, although the law should treat combatants
symmetrically.5 That sounds more like McMahan than it does like
Walzer.
This is not a criticism of Walzer. Just the opposite. What
reading the traditional sources highlights is the deep originality of
Just and Unjust Wars. It may have revived a forgotten tradition, but
it is not merely a twentieth-century update of traditional doctrines,
nor are Walzer’s arguments a restatement of the Greats. If Just and
Unjust Wars is by now the “standard” theory, and therefore the latest
of the Greats, that is because Walzer made it so.
One way Just and Unjust Wars is hardly standard is its
distinctive philosophical style, the use of “historical illustrations”
not merely to illustrate but to propel his moral argument. In his
preface, Walzer describes his method as “casuistic,” and so it is.
Some cases describe single incidents, some describe entire wars,
some scrutinize discrete philosophical arguments, like Mill on nonintervention or Sidgwick on in bello proportionality and necessity.
Now, today’s analytic just war theory in what I’ll call the
Oxford Style also makes crucial use of cases. But the cases are
radically different from Walzer’s, and serve different purposes.
Walzer insists on real cases, while the Oxford Style makes a point
of using unreal or “toy” cases. This is for a reason. The point of an
Oxford Style case is to pare away all morally confounding side
issues so only the principle under scrutiny is tested. When a
sequence of toy cases is artfully constructed, you will find yourself
pulled toward one and only one intuitively right answer for each case
in the sequence, and those answers will vary as the philosopher
manipulates first one variable and then another. The procedure is
like a law professor’s cascade of hypotheticals as she torments her
first-year students to force them to explain how Case A, where you
found for the plaintiff, wouldn’t compel you to find for the plaintiff
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in Case B where justice plainly runs the other direction. The idea is
to subject principles to a stress test in a controlled setting.
Walzer’s cases don’t work that way, and they do a different
job. It matters crucially to him that his are real cases, and although
he makes them brief – which is no less a form of abstraction than
the Oxford Style – they are never toy cases. In the fifth edition
postscript, he explains how he prepared to write Just and Unjust
Wars, first by reading the Greats and the manuals of international
law. But (he continues)
the greater part by far of my reading was not in theory
at all but in military history, both academic and
popular, and then in the memoir literature produced
by soldiers of different ranks (preferably the lower
ranks: junior officers and foot soldiers, who make the
toughest moral decisions on the battlefield); and then
in wartime journalism and commentary (especially
about Vietnam, the immediate occasion of my own
writing). Finally I read many of the novels and poems
that deal with the experience of fighting and with the
company of soldiers. The nontheoretical genres, and
the books and articles they include, seemed to me the
critically necessary material for my project …. I
wanted the moral arguments of my own book to ring
true to their authors – and to the men and women
about whom they were writing.6
It obviously bugs Walzer that analytic philosophers don’t think they
need that kind of reading, or at any rate that they don’t write as if
they need it. Oxford Style philosophers may respond that real-life
cases contain too many confounders to be useful in a stress test of
moral principles. You do a stress test in a doctor’s office, not while
the patient is playing football. But stress-testing isn’t Walzer’s aim,
which, in the words I’ve just quoted, is rather to make “the moral
arguments of my book ring true” to the soldiers. (Parenthetically, I
can’t help wondering whether memoirs by civilians trapped in a
battle space, or burying their collaterally damaged children, or
crowded into DP camps don’t also belong on the required reading
list, to make the moral arguments ring true to those men and women
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as well. A reading list should include a little more Mother Courage
and a little less Band of Brothers)
Perhaps more important than this difference, it’s crucial to
the Oxford Style that the toy cases are usually set in civilian life:
Anne coerces Barry to break Camille’s leg, which Dipak can prevent
by shooting Anne, or the like. The thought is presumably that we
can see the moral essentials most clearly outside the fog of war.
Doing so will enable us to think better about the wartime cases. That
may be true, provided the examples are ecologically valid when
transferred from civilian society to the battlefield. Walzer suspects
they can’t be, and in the postscript to the fifth edition, he complains
that the Oxford Style constructs what would be a marvelous morality
of war if war were a peacetime activity – in my view one of the
deepest-cutting philosophical one-liners I’ve ever read. 7 The
distinctiveness of war must not get blurred in the fog of peace.
Apart from ringing true to soldiers, it seems to me that
Walzer intends his examples to serve four other functions: first, to
reassure us and himself that the issue on the table is a real one, with
real urgency; second, to convey to civilian readers something of
what decision-making in war must feel like; third, to verify that his
prescriptions aren’t too fanciful or demanding for soldiers and
sailors to use in actual combat; and fourth, to give readers food for
thought. On the “food for thought” point, one the most attractive
features of Just and Unjust Wars is that every case in it invites
further reflection and conversation. Nothing ends with a “QED,”
and the reader is tempted to continue the conversation with “But
wait a minute ….” not with “well, that settles that.”
One way to describe this stylistic difference is through a
lovely distinction Avishai Margalit draws in The Ethics of Memory,
between “i.e. philosophy” and “e.g. philosophy” – roughly,
philosophy proceeding top-down from first principles and
philosophy proceeding bottom-up from examples. Rawls’s theory of
justice is paradigmatic “i.e.” philosophy. “E.g.” philosophy like
Margalit’s starts with cases, and it wends its way to its conclusions
by reflecting on those cases. “E.g.” philosophy never lets the cases
get wholly out of sight. It takes comfort from Sidney
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Morgenbesser’s dictum that to explain why a man slipped on a
banana peel you do not need a general theory of slipping.8
Now in my view Just and Unjust Wars lies near the happy
Aristotelian mean between “i.e.” and “e.g.”. Walzer is more
systematic than, say, Jon Elster, whose best writing is “e.g.” all the
way down. By contrast, Walzer’s initial statement of the Legalist
Paradigm has nothing of the “e.g.” about it: it’s a straightforward
catalogue of six general propositions.
Overall, though, Walzer’s method of organizing theory
around real cases places him in the “e.g.” camp. “I.e.” just war
theory first works out a general theory of the use of lethal violence
in individual self-defense, then applies it to wartime. “E.g.”
philosophy resists such procedures and demands that just war theory
start with war – or rather, with wars, plural, meaning actual cases.
Both methods have their strengths and their risks. The chief risk of
Walzer’s procedure is that the cases might not generalize as far as
he wants them to generalize. The chief risks of the Oxford Style are
scholasticism and unreality.
As befits a fortieth birthday party, let me return again to the
moment of birth. It is worth remembering two major events of 1977.
That June, diplomats adopted the Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, the first treaties to set out the jus in bello rules of
distinction and proportionality in the form familiar today. No doubt
Walzer’s book was already in galleys by then, so there was no
influence in either direction. Walzer was not keeping track of the
Geneva negotiations, but it’s remarkable how closely significant
Protocol rules track Just and Unjust Wars.
To take the most telling example, recall Walzer’s distinctive
version of the doctrine of double effect: he insists that it’s not
enough for soldiers not to intend to cause civilian collateral damage;
they must intend not to do so. Protocol I imposes a legally novel
affirmative obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid
civilian harm9: this is, in essence, Walzer’s concept of “intending
not,” cast in the form of legal rules. Now I don’t much believe in
Zeitgeists, but it’s hard not to suspect that the Geneva drafters and
Walzer were breathing the same intellectual and moral air. When we
8
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re-read these pages today, we should remember that Walzer wrote
his double effect analysis without the benefit of any hard-law rules
to draw on.
There are also differences. Notably, Walzer is suspicious of
in bello proportionality and its utilitarian assumptions, whereas AP
I embraces it. This is a crucial difference, because Walzer’s mistrust
of utilitarianism is central to his argument. It brings me to the second
event of 1977 that matters.
During the first half of 1977, the Carter administration was
formulating and publicizing its pro- human rights foreign policy – a
watershed moment for the human rights movement. Following two
years after the Helsinki Accords, it was a pivotal moment in
American diplomacy that deeply boosted human rights movements
around the world.
The relevance is obvious. Walzer’s first-edition preface
cautions that he is not going to expound any theory of morality from
the ground up. But, he continues,
I want to suggest that the arguments we make about
war are most fully understood … as efforts to
recognize and respect the rights of individual and
associated men and women. The morality I shall
expound is in its philosophical form a doctrine of
human rights.10
It’s worth recalling that Walzer began work on Just and
Unjust Wars the year after Rawls published A Theory of Justice,
defending the priority of the right over the good in the teeth of the
utilitarian conventional wisdom of the previous two decades of
moral philosophy. In 1974 Nozick published Anarchy, State, and
Utopia, with its strongly individualistic theory of natural rights.
Alan Donagan’s rights-based The Theory of Morality appeared the
same year as Walzer’s book, and so did Dworkin’s Taking Rights
Seriously, announcing that rights are moral trump cards; Charles
Fried would publish Right and Wrong the following year. For the
moment, human rights had become the lingua franca of moral
philosophy. As I recall, most of these philosophers had been meeting
on a regular basis to discuss their works-in-progress, rather like the
Oxford Inkling meetings where Tolkien and C.S. Lewis read rough
10
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drafts to their friends over beer and bangers at a pub. What this
efflorescence of rights theories means for just war theory is worth
thinking about, and I will reflect on it shortly.
Let’s return to human rights as they function in Just and
Unjust Wars. Remember that Walzer calls his book “a doctrine of
human rights.”11 But human rights actually plays a smaller direct
role in the argument of Just and Unjust Wars than this language
would lead us to expect. It makes two important cameo appearances,
once in the jus ad bellum and once in the jus in bello.
The former is the one that over the years I’ve had the most
trouble with. In Walzer’s theory, aggression is the crime of war
because it assaults the right to self-determination of political
communities. Now, political communities are collectives, so we are
talking here about collective or group rights. Let’s re-read what
Walzer says about human rights in his first preface: he calls them
“the rights of individual and associated men and women.” Walzer
leaves space for collective rights. It’s easy to overlook those words
“… and associated”, especially because later Walzer says that the
rights of states “derive ultimately from the rights of individuals.”12
It’s natural, but I think mistaken, to read Just and Unjust Wars as a
doctrine of individual human rights.
Walzer gets from individual rights to community rights via
a metaphorical social contract – a metaphor, he tells us, “for a
process of association and mutuality,”13 a common life shaped over
a long period of time. He wants us to recognize that this common
life matters to us as much as personal liberty and free speech matter
to us. It matters enough to be included as the substance of a right. Is
it, though, a collective or an individual right? I think it must be
collective. If we’re forced to analyze it as an individual human right,
it would be the individual’s right to share in the common life of her
people.
But that is an awkward and misleading way to put it: it
sounds like an individual right against exile or isolation or group
persecution, which is not at all what Walzer is talking about. I take
this as evidence that the right to a common life fits more comfortably
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as a group right, not an individual right.14 It’s the revisionists who
are really the individual-rights theorists in today’s just war theory,
for it is they whose starting question is what makes an individual
liable to be killed notwithstanding the right to life.
As Walzer elaborates the right to share in a common life, it
generates a political right of self-determination. The latter move, I
should say, doesn’t follow automatically. It isn’t automatic that the
Kurds and Catalans and Kosovars need political self-determination
to enjoy their common life, and it isn’t hard to imagine scenarios
where political self-determination could ruin the Catalans’ common
life as it exists today, turning a prosperous province into a struggling
statelet.
But suppose we accept the premise that peoples have a
collective right of self-determination. Walzer derives two of his
major doctrines from it: first, that military aggressions are the crime
of war. Second, in one of the most famous parts of the book, Walzer
endorses John Stuart Mill’s argument against military interventions
to free an oppressed people: for Mill and Walzer, self-determination
requires that they be left to work out their destiny for themselves,
whether it be authoritarian or democratic.
Recalling the opening words of his first preface, it now
seems glaringly obvious that Walzer had Vietnam in mind. The U.S.
claimed to be supporting South Vietnam’s self-determination, but in
reality we were propping up a puppet government. Regardless of
what we – or many South Vietnamese – thought of the Communists,
self-determination meant the Vietnamese should work their destiny
out themselves, violently or not, as in the end they did. Whatever we
think today about Vietnam’s government, it’s their government.
But there’s a complication here. Walzer’s model of a
Burkean social contract – a common life worked out by a people
over time – fits ethnically homogeneous states best, and stable,
historically multi-ethnic states second best. Artificially piecedtogether multi-ethnic states where tribal or clan or religious ties are
stronger than ties to whole, and where group antagonisms run just
below the surface, are a less good fit. And states plagued by political,
14
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racial, or religious oppression don’t fit at all. In a racist or apartheid
state, the right of political self-determination benefits the common
life only of the dominant group, and therefore it isn’t truly a common
life. Not only does it exclude the victim groups from that common
life, it impedes them from fashioning a common life of their own.
As I shall suggest in my conclusion, this is a grave danger today.
By no means am I suggesting that outside military
intervention is the cure for the disease of oppression – “Libya” is
the two-syllable refutation of that thought. But when sovereignty
serves as a screen for oppression, and large parts of the nation don’t
enjoy its common life, Walzer’s theory isn’t the explanation of
what’s wrong with intervention. He recognized this in the first (and
succeeding) editions, 15 but it isn’t until the preface to his third
edition, where – with Srebrenica in mind – he fully acknowledges
that in states like Bosnia the value of sovereignty to the victims is
small and the barrier to intervention is low.16
Besides its role in the theory of jus ad bellum, human rights
also figures in the jus in bello – but, I think, mostly indirectly. There
is a small section titled “Human Rights,” built around a case study,
“The Rape of the Italian Women.” The example, drawn from World
War II, is that the Free French fighting in Italy needed the aid of
Moroccan mercenaries, who insisted on the right to rape Italian
women as part of their fringe benefits. Does military exigency
justify the deal?17 Tony Pfaff has written about a parallel dilemma
60 years later, in Iraq. Should U.S. police trainers turn a blind eye to
an Iraqi policeman who used torture, because firing him would turn
his powerful family against us?18
Walzer writes that “men and women … have a moral
standing independent of and resistant to the exigencies of war. A
legitimate act of war is one that does not violate the rights of the
people against whom it is directed.”19 I believe this is the only place
where Walzer directly invokes individual rights. And to me it’s
noteworthy that the context is a critique of utilitarianism, which
Walzer introduced in the preceding section. Throughout the book,
15

JUJW, all editions, p. 101.
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we see a suspicion of utilitarianism – not only here, but also in the
analysis of preventive war and in his “skepticism of the
proportionality rule” that he explicitly acknowledges in the 2015
Preface. 20 One philosophical function of rights-talk has been to
counteract utility-talk, and that seems to me an important function
rights-talk plays in Just and Unjust Wars.
Now, in his discussion of human rights Walzer also
acknowledges in passing that rights can be “surrendered or lost” by
voluntary actions. 21 One might say that the granular, detailed
analysis of rights-forfeiture is one of the main occupations of the
analytic just war theory industry. But Walzer doesn’t really take it
up, because – in my reading – the kind of legalistic and Hohfeldian
intricacy of analytic just war theory is not the approach to human
rights he favors. Immediately following the Rape of the Italian
Women, we find Walzer’s discussion of “The Status of
Individuals”22 and the famous examples of “naked soldiers” – cases
where soldiers are morally revolted by the prospect of picking off
an individual enemy soldier taking a bath, or pulling up his trousers,
or enjoying a beautiful sunrise, or lighting a cigarette. Although
Walzer doesn’t call this a human rights issue, it seems like a natural
continuation of the preceding section on human rights – intended as
such. To me, it describes an experience of the other that underlies
all genuine human rights thinking: the experience of human
solidarity across lines, including battle-lines. Confronted by the
individuated, helpless, and momentarily non-threatening enemy,
one says simply – ecce homo, behold the man.
Gabriella Blum has coined the phrase “the individualization
of war,” by which she means the gradual infusion of individualrights thinking into the laws of war – and individualization has
become a major topic in contemporary writing. In his 2015
Postscript, Walzer takes care to emphasize that war is an intensely
collectivizing experience. 23 It’s part of his rejoinder to the
revisionist penchant for thinking of killing in war as, so to speak, a
mere accumulation of individual killings in war. But I find in his
discussion of the naked soldier – and in his critiques of utilitarianism,
and in his stated commitment to human rights – a countervailing
20
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sympathy for individualization. I would describe it as humanistic, in
the sense reflected in Terence’s beautiful line “I am human, and
nothing human is alien to me.” Warfare is not alien, but neither is
the sheer humanity of the human being on the other side. One way,
then, to identify the difference between the analytic philosophy of
human rights and the approach in Just and Unjust Wars is the
difference between a kind of legalistic focus on the logic of rights
and a kind of humanism, each with its own strengths and weaknesses.
Human rights theory can’t do without an analysis of rights and
liabilities. But just war theory would be morally impoverished
without the kind of humanism we find in Just and Unjust Wars.
My remarks so far have been, so to speak, a preface to Just
and Unjust Wars. I want to conclude with a postscript. I have been
emphasizing that the year 1977 was a time of human rights
ascendancy, in philosophy, in foreign policy, and in public discourse.
Today, unfortunately, we are in an era of human rights retreat if not
collapse. At the apogee of human rights, politicians would deny their
human rights violations. Today they feel no need. In our time of
authoritarian populism, leaders spit on human rights and their
supporters cheer. I am not talking only about Myanmar and the
Philippines and Turkey and Syria. I’m talking about Western-style
democracies as well.
We see it in continental Europe’s elections and the British
yellow press’s loathing for the European Court of Human Rights.
Our own president said he would bring back waterboarding in a
heartbeat, whether it works or not, because they deserve it. Last
December, Israel’s supreme court rolled back its landmark antitorture decision of 1999,24 and much of the Israeli public views its
human rights organizations as enemies of the army.
In 1977, philosophers might have been inclined to see
utilitarianism as the opponent of rights theorizing. Today, we must
recognize that the opponent of rights is populist nationalism. One
hallmark is a pugnacious commitment to state sovereignty as a
24
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shield against outside human rights pressure, something we see
vividly today in Hungary and Poland. Another hallmark is,
unfortunately, a powerful commitment to the rights of political
communities, but one that comes coupled with an angry sense that
the political community doesn’t include everyone who lives in the
state’s territory – not the refugees, not the immigrants, not the ethnic
and racial minorities. These are the alien other, not part of “our”
communal life. Earlier, I remarked on how Walzer’s concept of
political community works best to model homogeneous nationstates like Norway, and worst to model multi-ethnic states with
angry majorities.
Now none of this directly undermines the validity of
Walzer’s theory of jus ad bellum; but it does weaken the political
theory on which it rests. It raises an orange flag over state
sovereignty grounded in the rights of political communities, when
the communities are being flagrantly gerrymandered to exclude
minority residents. More damagingly, rage at the alien other places
enormous stress on one of Walzer’s central commitments: the moral
equality of civilians, carrying the requirement that soldiers must take
equivalent risks to spare “their” civilians and ours.
Ultimately, though, the humanism of Just and Unjust Wars
plainly outshines the weakness I’ve identified. Unfortunately, at age
forty, the humanism of Just and Unjust Wars finds itself under
worldwide siege. As an admirer of the book and the vision behind it,
I can only wish for the siege to break – and for many happy returns,
and a next edition with a preface that affirms human rights in a time
of peril.

